Constitutional Law 1
Cases
Origin of Judicial Review
Marbury v Madison,
1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 21, ed. 60 (1803)
Facts
On his last day in office,
President John Adams named forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new
circuit court justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act. The
Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take control of the federal
judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took office.
The commissions were
signed by President Adams and sealed by acting Secretary of State John Marshall
(who later became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this
opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of Adams’s term as
president. Thomas Jefferson refused to honor the commissions, claiming that
they were invalid because they had not been delivered by the end of Adams’s
term.
William Marbury (P) was an
intended recipient of an appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus to
compel Jefferson’s Secretary of State, James Madison (D), to deliver the
commissions. The Judiciary Act of 1789 had granted the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus “…to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States.”
Issues
1 Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
2 Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
3 Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review
acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore
void?
4 Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the
Constitution?
5 Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule
(Marshall)
1 Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.
The order granting the commission takes effect when
the Executive’s constitutional power of appointment has been exercised, and the
power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing
the power has been performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became
effective when signed by President Adams.
2 Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first
duties of government is to afford that protection.
Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and
individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual who
considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy. The
President, by signing the commission, appointed Marbury a justice of the peace
in the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by
the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of the signature,
and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the
office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which
is a plain violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford him
a remedy.
3 Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review
acts of Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional and therefore
void.
It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial
Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with
each other, the Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to
regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act
of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern
the case to which they both apply.
4 No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of the Constitution.
The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall
have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all
other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.” If it had
been intended to leave it in the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the
judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of
that body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If
Congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction where the
Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the
distribution of jurisdiction made in the Constitution, is form without
substance.
5 No. The Supreme Court does not have original
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.
To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it
must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary
to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
It is the essential criterion of appellate
jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may
be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery
of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that paper,
and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of
mandamus denied. Marbury doesn’t get the commission.
See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional
law case brief holding that that the Constitution gives Congress the express
power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL
CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C. MAYOR, respondents
FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the
position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas
province.
On Oct 17 1935, the
provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l
Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of
office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared
with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be
declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral Commission passed a
resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to
dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed
period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the
issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the
Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions
as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the
Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy;
Whether or not The
Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature
of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by
the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec
4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral
Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest filed by
Ynsua.
Requisites of
Judicial Review
G.R.
No. L-5279
October 31, 1955
PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF
TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
HELD: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State control of private education was intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control and regulation by the State over all schools.
Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people.
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein."
Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement."Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
“Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein."
Issues:
WON the petitioners has locus standi
WON the court has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
1. NO.
Justice Laurel: "The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as
a result of its enforcement."Pascual v. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement.
Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds.
“Expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,' which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer."
2. NO.At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution that would radically alter the 1935 constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body.
Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it can fulfil its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes “ripeness”
